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Abstract—Cognitive satellite-terrestrial networks (CSTNs) have
been recognized as a promising network architecture for address-
ing spectrum scarcity problem in next-generation communication
networks. In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission for
CSTNs where the terrestrial base station (BS) serving as a green
interference resource is introduced to enhance the security of the
satellite link. Adopting a stochastic model for the channel state
information (CSI) uncertainty, we propose a secure and robust
beamforming framework to minimize the transmit power, while
satisfying a range of outage (probabilistic) constraints concerning
the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) recorded at the
satellite user and the terrestrial user, the leakage-SINR recorded at
the eavesdropper, as well as the interference power recorded at the
satellite user. The resulting robust optimization problem is highly
intractable and the key observation is that the highly intractable
probability constraints can be equivalently reformulated as the
deterministic versions with Gaussian statistics. In this regard, we
develop two robust reformulation methods, namely S-Procedure
and Bernstein-type inequality restriction techniques, to obtain a
safe approximate solution. In the meantime, the computational
complexities of the proposed schemes are analyzed. Finally, the ef-
fectiveness of the proposed schemes are demonstrated by numerical
results with different system parameters.
Index Terms—Satellite-terrestrial networks, physical-layer secu-
rity, robust beamforming, outage probability, power minimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS broadcast applications and multimedia services arebecoming increasingly popular, cooperative satellite and
terrestrial cell network has been emerged as a future het-
erogeneous network, which is capable of increasing coverage
range and conveying rich multimedia services (e.g., video on
demand (VoD) streaming and TV broadcasting, etc.) to users
Copyright (c) 2015 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However,
permission to use this material for any other purposes must be obtained from
the IEEE by sending a request to pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
B. Li and Z. Fei are with the School of Information and Electronics, Beijing
Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China (e-mail: libin sun@bit.edu.cn;
feizesong@bit.edu.cn).
Z. Chu and Pei Xiao are with the 5G Innovation Center (5GIC), Institute
of Communication Systems (ICS), University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH,
U.K. (e-mail: andrew.chuzheng7@gmail.com; p.xiao@surrey.ac.uk).
F. Zhou is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA, and is also with the School of
Information Engineering and Post-Doctoral Research Station of Environmental
Science and Engineering, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China (e-
mail: zhoufuhui1989@163.com).
K.-K. Wong is with the Department of Electronic and Electrical Engi-
neering, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, U.K. (e-mail: kai-
kit.wong@ucl.ac.uk).
anywhere [1], [2]. However, the exponentially growing demand
for multimedia contents may result in the spectrum scarcity.
To address this issue, cognitive radio has recently been applied
into the satellite-terrestrial network to improve the utilization of
radio spectrum resource, which is termed as cognitive satellite-
terrestrial network (CSTN) [3], [4]. This allows the satellite
network and the terrestrial cell network operating in the same
frequency band, playing a vital role in the development and full
realization of 5G networks.
Security is a critical concern faced by satellite communi-
cations [5] since the wireless information intended for the
destination devices are also obtained by the non-intended third
parties (i.e., eavesdroppers (Eves)) in the same beam due to
the openness of wireless links. In order to provide a high
level of information security, appropriate signal processing and
communication technologies need to be invoked to guarantee
the secure communication and the link qualities. Convention-
al strategies to secure communication for preventing unau-
thorized reception by Eves rely on cryptographic encryption
implemented in higher layer. However, the encryption based
methods entail a relatively high computation burden due to
the required key distribution and service management with
the explosive growth of wireless devices. As a complemen-
tary solution, physical-layer security has attracted significant
attention for safeguarding wireless networks. In this line of
research, physical-layer security for the multiple-input single-
output channels [6], multiple-input multiple-output channels
[7], relay channels [8], interference channels [9] and cognitive
channels [10] have been well pursued. Additionally, the concept
of directional modulation is recently exploited to enhance the
security from a practical implementation perspective [11]. In
this paper, we focus on physical-layer security in CSTNs by
taking advantage of the time-variability of wireless medium to
achieve secure transmission against eavesdropping.
A. Related Works and Motivation
Recent years have witnessed the research advancement in
the field of hybrid/integrated satellite-terrestrial cooperative net-
works for future multimedia services (e.g., see [1], [12]). For in-
stance, the hybrid satellite-terrestrial cooperative networks were
investigated in [13]–[17] based on Digital Video Broadcast-
Satellite Handheld (DVB-SH) standard. In this situation, many
researchers have analyzed the performance of hybrid satellite-
terrestrial networks in single antenna [16], [18] and multi-
antenna [17] scenarios, respectively. It is foreseeable that the
2number of connected devices will exceed 20 billion until 2020,
which requires extra spectrum resources. In this regard, the idea
of combining cognitive radio into satellite-terrestrial networks
has been presented in the literature [4], [19]–[21] with the
aim of enhancing the spectrum utilization by sharing the same
spectrum between the wireless terrestrial and satellite networks.
It is envisaged that the C-band (4-8 GHz) and S-band (2-4 GHz)
are to be shared between the terrestrial network and satellite
network. Also, the above 10 GHz Ka band is the most promising
candidate for cognitive satellite communications with significant
practical applications [22].
A number of research efforts have been dedicated in studying
CSTNs. Specifically, [20] provided possible cognitive coexis-
tence scenarios between the satellite and terrestrial networks,
and discussed several cognitive techniques as enablers. [4]
studied an optimal power allocation mechanism in the novel ar-
chitecture, and [21] presented the cognitive exploitation schemes
for both the forward- and return-links devoting the improvement
of system performance. Considering the real-time applications
in the CSTNs, the authors in [23] maximized the delay-limited
capacity and outage capacity of the satellite link by designing
two power control schemes. In [24], the outage probability
expression of the terrestrial secondary user (SU) was derived
in a closed-form while satisfying the interference constraint to
the satellite primary user (PU) imposed by wireless terrestrial
network.
In recent years, the capability of enhancing the privacy and
security of satellite communications is also an attractive benefit
brought by physical-layer security compared to cryptographic
encryption [25]. In the seminal work of [26], Lei et al. studied
the security oriented beamforming and power control in a
multibeam satellite communication in order to minimize the
transmit power, while maintaining individual secrecy rate con-
straint. Subsequently, [27] proposed the optimal strategy design
to improve the security of multibeam satellite communication,
and the artificial noise was explored as an additional degree-
of-freedom to protect against Eves. To circumvent the masking
effect from the satellite to the terrestrial terminals, the authors of
[28] investigated the secure transmission with the assistance of
a relay for a hybrid satellite-terrestrial network. The framework
of physical-layer security to enhance secrecy performance in
CSTNs was first established in [3], where the authors derived
the tractable expressions of the secrecy outage probability of
satellite user (i.e., PU). Meanwhile, a joint beamforming design
at satellite and terrestrial BS for a CSTN was proposed in
[29] so as to maximize the secrecy rate of the PU. Although
the aforementioned works have provided a solid understanding
of physical-layer security in the satellite communications, the
research on the secrecy communication for CSTNs is still in its
infancy.
The channel state information (CSI) availability is one of
the utmost important issues in implementing the secure trans-
mission design. In practical instances, it is very challenging
to obtain accurate CSI at each communication node due to
channel quantization errors, feedback delay and dynamics of
wireless channels, especially in CSTNs where the information
exchange between the satellite and terrestrial networks is limit-
ed. Therefore, robust design has aroused great interests due to
the ability of offering performance guarantees for optimization
problems with uncertainty [3], [14]. In general, there are two
classes of models to characterize imperfect CSI: the determin-
istic (worst-case) and stochastic uncertainty models. Taking the
deterministic uncertainty model into account, a growing body
of robust secure transmission for satellite communications has
been studied in [26], [27], in which the CSI uncertainty is
bounded by possible values. We note that the worst-case setting
characterized by deterministic uncertainty model infrequently
occurs and may not reflect practical channels accurately. While
in contrast, the stochastic uncertainty model is a better choice
for dealing with the estimated errors which are often modeled
as Gaussian random variables [30]. It has been shown in [31]
that the probabilistic design using a stochastic uncertainty model
could guarantee a certain chance of successful quality of service
(QoS) deliveries (1 outage probability%), which was a very
important performance metric in satellite communications.
In CSTNs, the interference from the terrestrial BS is benefi-
cial to combat the malicious eavesdropping attack but is harmful
to the satellite user (i.e., PU) in the satellite network. As a
result, the terrestrial network has to properly design its transmit
beamforming vector by considering the interference to the PU
and Eve. However, prior works paid attention to the robust
secure communication in the satellite network solely, there is
no work focusing on the stochastic secure beamforming design
with CSI uncertainty for CSTNs, which is the emphasis of this
paper.
B. Approaches and Contributions
This paper studies the physical-layer security for CSTNs
consisting of a satellite network and a terrestrial network. To
realize the green communication target, we consider the robust
design of power minimization transmission strategies in a secure
CSTN by incorporating channel uncertainties. Unlike [3], from a
more practical point of view, the probabilistic CSI error model
is employed in our work to address the robust beamforming
design problem, while maintaining the SINR outage constraints1
for PU, Eve and SU. The detailed contributions are summarized
as follows.
 We investigate the problem of downlink beamforming for
secure CSTN by considering the practical scenario of
imperfect CSI regarding the PU’s, Eve’s and SU’s links,
where the interference from the terrestrial network can be
utilized for confounding the Eve. To the best knowledge
of the authors, the robust problem of interference-aware
resource allocation in CSTN has not been addressed in the
literature.
 We propose a stochastic beamforming framework to min-
imize the transmit power while ensuring the outage QoS
requirements, i.e., the minimum SINR target at PU, the
maximum tolerance leakage-SINR target at Eve, the mini-
mum transmission SINR target at SU and the interference
1Note that the terms outage constraint and probabilistic constraint are used
interchangeably in this paper for convenience.
3power constraint to PU. Under this framework, the CSI
is characterized by a probabilistic model. Such problem is
non-convex owing to lack of the closed-form expressions
associated with the outage constraints, thus we develop two
conservative approximation methods, i.e., S-Procedure and
Bernstein-type inequality.
 With the aid of the two kinds of mathematical tools, we
reformulate the original problem into an easier problem re-
spectively, which has finite constraints. Then, we apply the
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and construct the solvable
semidefinite programming (SDP) problems, which result
in safe2 approximate solutions.
 Finally, we show that the solutions of the relaxed SDP
problems always yield rank-one, which indicate that the
relaxations are tight. Furthermore, the computational com-
plexities for the proposed schemes are evaluated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we present the network model and the channel
model. In Section III, we formulate the corresponding outage
constrained optimization problem using stochastic CSI model.
In Section IV, we propose two robust schemes to address the
original complex optimization problem. Numerical results are
provided in Section V. Finally, the conclusions of this paper
are offered in Section VI.
Notations: Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold lower
case and upper case letters. AH , rank(A) and Tr(A) indicate
the conjugate transpose, rank and trace of the matrix A, re-
spectively. The expectation of a random variable is represented
by Efg and the Euclidean norm of a vector is represented by
k  k. Random vector x  CN (;) follows the distribution
of a complex Gaussian with mean  and covariance matrix
. By X  0, we mean that X is a positive semidefinite
matrix. The operator Prfg denotes the probability measure,
Refg denotes the real part of the scalar, and [R]m;n denotes
(m;n)-th component of matrix R.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a downlink CSTN as depicted Fig. 1, where the
satellite network coexists the terrestrial network sharing the
same radio spectrum resource. Specifically, the satellite down-
link corresponds to the primary network and the terrestrial
downlink corresponds to the secondary network. In the primary
network, the geostationary orbit (GEO) satellite (SAT) with
single antenna (a.k.a. feed) sends confidential message to the
fixed satellite terminal (i.e., PU) in the presence of an Eve
attempting to overhear the satellite information signal in the
same beam. In the secondary network, the terrestrial BS is
assumed to has Nt antennas communicating with a terrestrial
user3 (i.e., SU) for simplicity. We assume that the PU, Eve and
SU each has a single antenna. In this considered CSTN, the
co-channel interference is taken into account. In particular, the
transmit signal from the terrestrial BS, as a friendly interference
2“Safe” indicates that the feasible set composed by the approximated con-
straint is a subset of the original feasible set.
3We note that the considered system model can be extended to include
multiple SUs at the expense of a more involved notation.
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Fig. 1. System model of cognitive satellite-terrestrial networks.
resource, can be introduced into the satellite link for improving
communication security of the PU.
Of particular note, the terrestrial network only knows the
stochastic CSI of PU, Eve, SU, which is a more practical
assumption that distinguishes our work from state-of-the-art.
The considered scenario may find wide applications in future
5G wireless communication systems (such as those for mul-
timedia services). Furthermore, since the satellite channel and
the terrestrial channel are inherently different, the physical-layer
security in CSTNs is more challenging. In what follows, we will
discuss the detailed channel models.
A. Satellite Channel Model
It is well known that the radiowave propagation over the
air is impaired by various atmospheric effects, such as rain,
fog, poor angle of inclination, etc. However, the satellite links
operate at high frequency bands, the atmospheric attenuation
will be the major impairment for propagations channels. For
practical purposes, the satellite link is modeled by composite
fading distribution for describing the statistical properties of
the signal envelope accurately. Currently, the Shadowed-Rician
fading model has been widely-adopted in the literature [3], [24],
[32]. Based on this model, the corresponding channel fading
coefficient is given by
~hi = A exp(j i) + Z exp(ji); (1)
where ~hi (i 2 fp; e; sg) is the channel coefficient between SAT
and the corresponding terminal i, which includes the scattering
and the line-of-sight (LOS) components.  i 2 [0; 2) represents
the stationary random phase and i represents the deterministic
phase of the LOS component. A and Z denote the amplitudes of
the scattering and the LOS components, which are independent
stationary random processes following Rayleigh and Nakagami-
m distributions, respectively. Specifically, the Shadowed-Rician
fading distribution can be represented as ~hi = (bi;mi;
i), with
2bi being the average power of the scatter component, 
i the
average power of the LOS component and 0  mi  1 the
Nakagami fading parameter.
On another front, for the large distance from the SAT to
satellite terminals, free-space path loss is an immediate obstacle
4in satellite channels. According to [33], the free-space path loss
coefficient can be written as
CL =


4
2
1
d20 + d
2
h
; (2)
where  stands for the carrier wavelength, d0 denotes the
distance of the center of the satellite coverage area from the
center of the central beam, and dh = 35786 km accounts for
the height of SAT.
In addition, the beam gain is determined by the SAT antenna
pattern and the position of a user. Given a user’s position within
the satellite spot beam coverage area, the beam gain factor can
be expressed as [27], [34]
b('i) = bmax

J1(ui)
2ui
+ 36
J3(ui)
u3i
2
; (3)
with
ui = 2:07123
sin'i
sin('3dB)i
; (4)
where b('i) depends on user i’s location. bmax is the maximal
satellite antenna gain, '3dB represents the 3-dB angle, 'i
represents the angle between the corresponding user i and the
beam center from the SAT. J1() and J3() correspond to the
first-kind Bessel functions of order 1 and 3.
Integrating the above three main factors, for any given satel-
lite link, the entire satellite channel can be modeled as
hi =
p
b('i)~hi; 8i 2 fp; e; sg: (5)
B. Terrestrial Channel Model
For the terrestrial cellular network, the terrestrial BS and
user terminals may not be in close proximity to each other.
According to the channel model introduced by [35], we assume
that the terrestrial links go through the correlated Rayleigh
fading without loss of generality. Using the commonly adopted
Kronecker model, the terrestrial channel vector is modeled as
gi = R
1
2
i ~gi; 8i 2 fp; e; sg; (6)
where ~gi 2 CNs1 (i 2 fp; e; sg) denotes the channel gain
between the terrestrial BS and user i, which follows Rayleigh
fading. Ri is the corresponding correlation matrix. Following
the study of [3], the uniform linear antenna (ULA) array is
assumed to be adopted at the terrestrial BS, and the correlation
matrix Ri; (i = fp; e; sg) with the (m;n)-th element can be
computes as
[Ri]m;n 
1
2
Z 2
0
exp

 j2(m  n)i d

sin i

d; (7)
where i corresponds to the angle-of departure (AOD), i is
the angle spread and d is the distance between the two adjacent
antennas.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let xp and xs be the signals transmitted by the SAT and the
terrestrial BS, with unit power Efjxpj2g = 1 and Efjxsj2g =
1 respectively without loss of generality. The linear transmit
beamforming is performed at the terrestrial BS to protect the
PU from eavesdropping, then the received signal yp at PU can
be formulated as
yp =
p
Pphpxp + g
H
p wxs + np; (8)
and ye at Eve can be formulated as
ye =
p
Pphexp + g
H
e wxs + ne; (9)
and ys at SU can be formulated as
ys = g
H
s wxs +
p
Pphsxp + ns; (10)
where Pp denotes the transmit power of the SAT and w 2
CNt1 is the beamforming vector. ni  CN (0; 2i ) (i 2
fp; e; sg) denotes additive Gaussian noise at the corresponding
receiver i, where 2i denotes the corresponding background
noise power.
Assuming all the receiving nodes apply single user detection,
according to (8) and (9), the achievable SINRs at PU and Eve
can be expressed, respectively, as
SINRp =
Ppjhpj2
jgHp wj2 + 2p
; (11)
SINRe =
Ppjhej2
jgHe wj2 + 2e
: (12)
It can be seen from (11) and (12) that the interference from the
terrestrial BS affects both SINRp and SINRe. If we implement
transmit beamforming design at the terrestrial BS to deteriorate
the output SINR of Eve, the security of PU can be improved. To
this end, beamforming vector w should be properly managed
in accordance with the channel condition such that the transmit
signal from the terrestrial BS does not severely interfere with
the PU.
Similarly, from (10), the achievable SINR at SU can be
expressed as
SINRs =
jgHs wj2
Ppjhsj2 + 2s
: (13)
In practical communication systems, the channel knowledge
of PU and Eve is unavailable at the terrestrial BS since the PU
and Eve are within the satellite network4 [36]. Meanwhile, we
assume that the CSI of SU is also unavailable to the terrestrial
BS due to estimated and feedback errors. In addition, we assume
that the channel knowledge of satellite links is available at the
SAT, which is possible because the satellite terminals can be
monitored and can use feedback/training data. However, the CSI
of satellite terminals may not be available at the SAT due to the
large distance, we will consider this case in our future work. In
this setup, we adopt a stochastic model [30], [37] to characterize
4This is because for transmitter-receiver pairs in different networks, it is very
hard for the terrestrial BS to know the precise CSI of the terrestrial BS-PU link
gp and the terrestrial BS-Eve link ge.
5the CSI imperfection, thus the channel vectors can be modeled,
respectively, as
gp = g^p +gp; ge = g^e +ge; gs = g^s +gs; (14)
where g^p, g^e and g^s denote the imperfect channel estimate
vectors, which are known to the terrestrial BS. And gp, ge
and gs denote the corresponding channel errors/uncertainties,
which tend to be Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and
covariance regarding gp  CN (0;
p), ge  CN (0;
e),
gs  CN (0;
s), where 
p  0, 
e  0, and 
s  0 stand
for the covariance matrices corresponding channel estimation
errors.
Correspondingly, the CSI error vectors are rewritten as
gp = 

1=2
p rp; 
p = 

1=2
p 

1=2
p ; (15)
ge = 

1=2
e re; 
e = 

1=2
e 

1=2
e ; (16)
gs = 

1=2
s rs; 
s = 

1=2
s 

1=2
s ; (17)
where we have rp  CN (0; INt), re  CN (0; INt) and rs 
CN (0; INt).
In this considered scenario, the SU and PU operate on the
same spectrum resource. However, the PU is licensed user and
hence the terrestrial BS is required to guarantee the QoS of the
PU via a proper transmit beamforming design. To guarantee
the green and secure communications, we aim to minimize
the power consumption of the terrestrial BS by designing the
beamforming vector w under the SINR outage limit for the PU,
the leakage-SINR outage limit for the Eve, the SINR outage
limit for the SU, and the interference outage limit for the PU.
Therefore, the robust optimization problem can be formulated
as
min
w
kwk2 (18a)
s.t. Pr fSINRp  pg  1  p; (18b)
Pr fSINRe  eg  1  e; (18c)
Pr fSINRs  sg  1  s; (18d)
Pr
jgHp wj2  th	  1  th; (18e)
where p > 0 represents the prescribed SINR target of the
PU for information decoding, e > 0 denotes the maximum
tolerable SINR of the Eve for eavesdropping, s > 0 and
th > 0 denote the minimum SINR threshold of the SU for
guaranteeing the reliable communication and the maximum tol-
erable interference constraint of the PU; p 2 (0; 1], e 2 (0; 1],
s 2 (0; 1] and th 2 (0; 1] stand for the prescribed maximal
outage probability of the SINR recorded at the PU, of the SINR
recorded at the Eve, of the SINR at the SU, as well as of
the interference recorded at the PU, respectively. Furthermore,
the constraint (18b) represents the probability of the minimum
required received SINR of the PU p being no less than
(1 p) 100%; the constraint (18c) represents the probability
of the maximum tolerable received SINR of the Eve e being
no less than (1   e)  100%; the constraint (18d) represents
the probability of the minimum required received SINR of the
SU s being no less than (1  s) 100%; the constraint (18e)
represents the probability of the maximum tolerable interference
threshold of the PU th being no less than (1  th) 100%.
In problem (18), the minimum guaranteed SINR constraint
of PU and the maximum tolerable SINR constraint of Eve
can be reformulated as secret rate constraint [30], which due
to the fact that the secret rate monotonically increases with
the SINR at PU but decreases with that at Eve. For given
p > 0 and e > 0, the secret rate of PU can be ex-
pressed as Rsec = [log2(1 + SINRp)  log2(1 + SINRe)] 
[log2(1 + p)  log2(1 + e)]. As a result, we know from the
constraints (18b) and (18c) that, by adjusting the values of
given SINR targets, the lower bound of secret rate Rsec can
be guaranteed by solving problem (18).
Remark 1: In fact, the secondary link can access the spectrum
licensed to PU under the condition that the transmission security
of the primary link is ensured. This model has been well justified
in the secure resource allocation literature [29], [38], [39]. As
a result, the interference outage constraint to the PU can be
neglected in the sequel, as we focus on the requirement of secure
communication relying on the constraints (18b)-(18d).
Remark 2: It should be noted that a long-term interference
outage probability constraint is considered in this paper to guar-
antee the QoS of the PU. While for the real-time applications,
a short-term instantaneous interference constraint would be a
more suitable choice [40], [41].
IV. ROBUST BEAMFORMING DESIGN WITH OUTAGE
CONSTRAINTS
We note that the problem given by (18) is non-convex
due to the outage constraints in (18b)-(18d) do not admit
tractable closed-form expressions, which is very challenging
and complicated to solve problem (18) directly. To overcome
this predicament, we focus on how to transform the outage
constraints (18b)-(18d) into equivalent yet more tractable forms.
There are in general two popularly used methods for robust
optimization problem with probabilistic constraints: probability
distribution method and approximation method [42]. In what
follows, we develop two approaches to solve problem (18)
respectively by SDP relaxation, and then the tightness of the
applied rank-relaxation is further investigated.
A. S-Procedure Based Method
We start by defining new matrix W = wwH with
rank(W) = 1 and W  0 2 CNtNt . Then, the output SINR
of the PU in (18b), i.e., SINRp  p, can be expressed in terms
of W as
1
p
Ppjhpj2  (g^p +gp)HW (g^p +gp) + 2p: (19)
Substituting (15) into (19) and rearranging the term, we can
obtain
g^p +

1=2
p rp
H
A

g^p +

1=2
p rp

+
1
p
Ppjhpj2   2p  0;
(20)
where A =  W. To further proceed, we introduce the follow-
ing lemma [43].
6Lemma 1: For an arbitrary set B 2 CNt1 satisfying Prfa 2
Bg  1  , we have
aHQa+ 2Re(aHr) + c  0; 8a 2 B; (21)
=) Pr aHQa+ 2Re(aHr) + c  0	  1  : (22)
Using Lemma 1, constraint (18b) is transformed into the
following deterministic quadratic constraint:
f(rp) , rHp 
1=2p A
1=2p rp+2Re
n
rHp 

1=2
p Ag^p
o
+ g^Hp Ag^p
+
1
p
Ppjhpj2   2p  0: (23)
It is noted that rp is located in the sphere set Bp =
rp 2 CNt1jkrpk2  R2p
	
, where Rp is the sphere radius.
According to [30], it is sufficient for Pr ff(rp)  0g  1 p to
hold if Pr frp 2 Bp  1  pg. Recall that rp  CN (0; INt),
Rp can be obtained by Rp =
q
Im(1 p)
2 , where Im() rep-
resents the inverse cumulative distribution function of the Chi-
square random variable and the degree-of-freedom is m = 2Nt.
Similarly, applying Lemma 1, the constraints in (18c) and
(18d) are respectively transformed into the following determin-
istic quadratic constraints:
f(re) , rHe 
1=2e W
1=2e re+2Re
n
rHe 

1=2
e Wg^e
o
+ g^He Wg^e
+ 2e  
1
e
Ppjhej2  0; (24)
f(rs) , rHs 
1=2s W
1=2s rs+2Re
n
rHs 

1=2
s Wg^s
o
+ g^Hs Wg^s
  s(Ppjhsj2 + 2s)  0; (25)
where re and rs are bounded to the sphere sets
Be =

re 2 CNt1jkrek2  R2e
	
and Bs =
rs 2 CNt1jkrsk2  R2s
	
, Re and Rs are the corresponding
sphere radiuses respectively.
In this setup, incorporating (23)-(25), the power minimization
problem (18) can be equivalently recast as
min
W0
Tr(W) (26a)
s.t. f(rp)  0; rHp INtrp  
Im(1  p)
2
 0; (26b)
f(re)  0; rHe INtre  
Im(1  e)
2
 0; (26c)
f(rs)  0; rHs INtrs  
Im(1  s)
2
 0; (26d)
rank(W) = 1: (26e)
While problem (26) is still non-convex, since (26b)-(26d) have
infinite constraints due to the randomness of error vectors
rp; re; rs and the rank-one constraint (26e) is non-convex, which
is intractable. To make this problem tractable, with the help of
S-Procedure [44], we first transform the constraints (26b)-(26d)
into linear matrix inequalities (LMIs).
Lemma 2: (S-Procedure [44]): Define the function
fk(x) = x
HAkx+ 2Re

bHk x
	
+ ck; k = 1; 2; (27)
where Ak 2 Cnn, bk 2 Cn1, x 2 Cn1, and ck 2 R. Then,
f1(x)  0 =) f2(x)  0 holds if and only if there exists a
  0 such that


A1 b1
bH1 c1

 

A2 b2
bH2 c2

 0 (28)
supposed that there exists a vector x^ such that f1(x^) < 0.
Based on Lemma 2 and then applying the SDR to omit
the rank-one constraint (26e), the robust power minimization
problem (26) can be reformulated as a convex SDP problem
given by (29), as shown at the top of next page. The optimal
solution to SDP (29) can be effectively found via existing
optimization tools, e.g., SeduMi or CVX [44].
It is worth mentioning that the rank-one constraint on W
has been relaxed in problem (29), whereas a key problem
stemming from the relaxation is the rank condition of the
obtained optimal solution. In general, the optimal solution of
rank-relaxed problem may not be rank-one, and the result of
the relaxed problem serves as a performance upper bound for
the original problem. The approximation solution of the original
problem can be achieved by applying randomization techniques.
Fortunately, we can prove in the following that the optimal
solution W of problem (29) is of rank-one. Accordingly,
the obtained optimal solution of problem (29) is indeed the
optimal solution of the original problem (18) and the optimal
beamforming vector w can be achieved by calculating the
eigenvalue decomposition. In other words, the SDR of problem
(29) is tight, i.e., we can attain the global optimal solution.
Proposition 1: There exists a rank-one optimal solution,
denoted as W, to SDR of problem (29).
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
B. Bernstein-Type Inequality Based Method
Despite the method aforementioned benefits from the com-
putational efficiency owing to the convex approximation, the S-
Procedure approach is less conservative. To find a better approx-
imation, in this subsection, we propose to employ the Bernstein-
inequality approach as a tool to tackle problem (18) by de-
riving a series of approximate expressions to the probabilistic
constraints. The comparison of S-Procedure and Bernstein-type-
inequality approaches is even more important in CSTN due to
this inherent difference between the two approaches.
To start with, to circumvent this difficulty of probabilis-
tic constraints (18b)-(18d), using the Bernstein-type inequality
technique [43], the non-convex expressions can be reduced to
deterministic versions. This technique is given by following the
lemma.
Lemma 3: For a three-field notation (Q; r; c) 2 HnCnR,
s  CN (0; In) and  2 (0; 1], the sufficient condition for
Pr

sHQs+ 2Re(sHr) + c  0	  1   (30)
is equivalent to the following series of linear matrix inequality
7min
W;p;e;s
Tr(W) (29a)
s.t.
"


1=2
p A

1=2
p + pINt 

1=2
p Ag^p
g^Hp A

1=2
p g^Hp Ag^p +
Pp
p
jhpj2   2p   p Im(1 p)2
#
 0; (29b)"


1=2
e W

1=2
e + eINt 

1=2
e Wg^e
g^He W

1=2
e g^He Wg^e + 
2
e   Ppe jhej2   e
Im(1 e)
2
#
 0; (29c)"


1=2
s W

1=2
s + sINt 

1=2
s Wg^s
g^Hs W

1=2
s g^Hs Wg^s   s(Ppjhsj2 + 2s)  s Im(1 s)2
#
 0; (29d)
W  0; p  0; e  0; s  0: (29e)
(LMI) and second-order cone (SOC) constraints:8>>><>>>:
tr(Q) p 2 ln t1 + t2 ln  + c  0;
"
vec(Q)p
2r
#  t1;
t2In +Q  0; t2  0;
(31)
where t1 and t2 are the slack variables.
By applying the results of Lemma 3 and introducing the slack
variables p  0 and p  0, the SINR outage constraint of
the PU, i.e., Pr ff(rp)  pg  1   p, can be equivalently
converted into a sequence of finite convex constraints as8>>>><>>>>:
Tr(

1=2
p A

1=2
p ) 
p 2 ln pp + p ln p + cp  0;
"
vec(

1=2
p A

1=2
p )p
2

1=2
p Ag^p
#  p;
pINt +

1=2
p A

1=2
p  0; p  0;
(32)
where cp = g^Hp Ag^p +
Pp
p
jhpj2   2p.
Using similar step for the tolerant leakage-SINR outage
constraint of the Eve, i.e., Pr ff(re)  eg  1   e, it can
also be equivalently converted into a sequence of finite convex
constraints as8>>>><>>>>:
Tr(

1=2
e W

1=2
e ) 
p 2 ln ee + e ln e + ce  0;
"
vec(

1=2
e W

1=2
e )p
2

1=2
e Wg^e
#  e;
eINt +

1=2
e W

1=2
e  0; e  0;
(33)
where ce = g^He Wg^e + 
2
e   Ppe jhej2. e  0 and e  0 are
the introduced the slack variables.
As for the SINR outage constraint of the SU, i.e.,
Pr ff(rs)  sg  1   s, by introducing slack variables
s  0, s  0 and applying the results of Lemma 3, it can be
recast as8>>>><>>>>:
Tr(

1=2
s W

1=2
s ) 
p 2 ln ss + s ln p + cs  0;
"
vec(

1=2
s W

1=2
s )p
2

1=2
s Wg^s
#  s;
sINt +

1=2
s W

1=2
s  0; s  0;
(34)
where cs = g^Hs Wg^s   s
 
Ppjhsj2 + 2s

.
Incorporating (32)-(34) and applying the rank-one relaxation,
the corresponding robust optimization problem is reformulated
as the following convex SDP, i.e.,
min
W;p;p;e;e;s;s
Tr(W) (35a)
s.t. (32); (33) and (34); (35b)
W  0; p  0; p  0; (35c)
e  0; e  0; s  0; s  0: (35d)
Remarkably, the optimal solution to the convex problem (35)
can be found by using the convex optimization solvers, e.g.,
SeduMi or CVX [44]. Since the rank-one constraint on W
has been relaxed in problem (35), the attained optimal solution
may not be rank one. In the following, we can prove that the
optimal solutionW of (35) satisfies the condition of rank-one.
Accordingly, the obtained optimal solution to the rank relaxation
of problem (35) is indeed the optimal solution to the original
problem (18). In other words, the rank relaxation of problem
(35) is tight, i.e., we can achieve the global optimal solution.
Proposition 2: There exists a rank-one optimal solution,
denoted as W, to SDR of problem (35).
The proof is similar to the Appendix B in [30], we omit it
here for brevity.
C. Computational Complexity
In this part, the computational complexities of the proposed
robust secure schemes are analyzed. It is worth mentioning that
the convex restriction formulations (29) and (35) involve only
LMI and SOC constraints, and hence we apply standard interior-
point methods to solve them. According to [43], the complexity
is composed of two parts, namely, iteration complexity and
the per-iteration computation cost. Specially, the computational
complexity per-iteration mainly arises from the number of
optimization variables, the number of LMI constraints and the
size, the number of the SOC constraints and the size. For the S-
Procedure based method, the optimization problem (29) has N2t
design variables and 3 slack variables, 3 LMI constraints of size
Nt + 1, one LMI constraint of size Nt, and 3 LMI constraints
of size 1. For the Bernstein-type-inequality based method, the
optimization problem (35) has N2t design variables and 6 slack
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Fig. 2. Average transmission power versus minimum SINR constraint at PU
p with  = 0:1.
variables, 4 LMI constraints of size Nt, 12 LMI constraints of
size 1, and 3 SOC constraints of dimension N2t +Nt + 1.
From Table I, we can see that the proposed methods are
computationally efficient for the non-convex beamforming op-
timization. The computational complexity of the Bernstein-
type-inequality based method is larger than that of the S-
Procedure based method, since the proposed Bernstein-type-
inequality based method has a more complicated set involving
the LMI and SOC constraints. However, the performance of the
Bernstein-type-inequality based method is superior to that of
the S-Procedure based method in terms of power consumption,
which is exhibited by numerical results presented in Section V.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results for evaluating
the performance of the proposed robust design methods in a
CSTN scenario. We consider the scenario that the number of
antennas at the terrestrial BS is set to Nt = 4 unless otherwise
specified, and the other communication nodes have a single an-
tenna. It is assumed that the satellite links follow the Shadowed-
Rician fading distribution and undergo heavy shadowing with
parameters (bi;mi;
i) = (0:063; 2; 8:9710 4); 8i 2 fp; e; sg
[45]. In our simulation setup, the beam angles between SAT and
PU, Eve, as well as SU are respectively set as 0:01, 0:4, and
0:8. The transmit power at SAT is set to be Pp = 40 W. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that the covariance matrices of
the channel error vectors are identical as 
p = 
e = 
s = INt
where  = 0:005 is the channel error variance, and the outage
probabilities are p = e = s = . We set the 3-dB angle as
'3dB = 0:4
, the carrier frequency as  = 2 GHz, the maximal
antenna gain of SAT bmax = 52 dBi, the inter-element spacing
as d = 2 , the AOD from terrestrial BS to SU as s = 0
, the
AOD from terrestrial BS to PU as p = 40, the angle spread
as s = e = 5 [3]. All simulation results are derived by
averaging over 1000 randomly generated channel realizations.
Fig. 2 shows the average transmission power performance
of the proposed S-Procedure method, the proposed Bernstein-
type method, the deterministic uncertainty model based scheme
(denoted as “Worst-case” method) [46] and the non-robust
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Fig. 3. Average transmission power versus maximum tolerant SINR constraint
at Eve e with p = 10 dB and e = 0 dB.
scheme (denoted as “Non-robust”). Note that the non-robust
scheme is obtained using the nominal vectors g^p, g^e and g^s.
In this setup, we set the maximum tolerable SINR at Eve as
e = 0 dB and the minimum SINR requirement at SU as
s = 15 dB. As expected, we observe from Fig. 2 that the
proposed Bernstein-type method is distinctly better than the S-
Procedure method, the approximation exploited in the Bernstein-
type method is tighter than that in the S-Procedure method and
the performance gain becomes more evident with increasing p.
It can also be seen that the average transmission power of the
terrestrial BS increases with the minimum SINR constraint at
PU, no matter whether the models of the CSI errors. This is
because a higher transmission power is allocated in order to
satisfy the increasing SINR requirement at PU. Compared with
the non-robust design, the proposed schemes achieve robustness
at the cost of slightly increased transmission power. Although
the deterministic-constraint based worst-case scheme consumes
less transmission power than the proposed outage constrained
robust methods, the extreme scenario may happen rarely and
may not reflect practical channels accurately.
Fig. 3 depicts the average transmission power against the
maximum tolerant SINR requirement e at Eve under different
, in which the minimum SINR requirement at PU and SU is
p = 10 dB and s = 0 dB respectively. It is observed that, with
the increasing of e, the average transmission power decreases
and the curves tends to become stable when e is large. This is
due to the fact that when e is large enough, the SINR constraint
at Eve becomes independent of the beamforming design and in
such a case the network will be reduced to that without secrecy.
From Fig. 3, we can also see that the performance loss between
the proposed robust design methods and the non-robust design
method is small. Furthermore, it is interesting to mention that
the robust secure beamforming designs have a slight impact on
large outage probability .
Next, we compare the power consumption performance of the
proposed robust design methods for different number of transmit
antennas associated with Nt = 4 and Nt = 6, respectively.
The parameter settings in this setup are the same as those in
Fig. 2. As shown in Fig. 4, it is obvious that the transmission
9TABLE I
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS.
Methods Computation Complexity Order (Ignoring ln(1=) in O() ln(1=), where  denotes an accuracy).
S-Procedure O  p4Nt + 6  n  3(Nt + 1)2(Nt + 1 + n) +N2t (Nt + n) + 3 + n+ n2, where n = O(N2t + 3).
Bernstein-type-inequality O  p4Nt + 15  n  4N2t (Nt + n) + 3(N2t +Nt + 2) + 12 + 12n+ n2, where n = O(N2t + 6).
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power of the proposed design methods greatly degrades with the
increasing of the transmit antennas Nt at the terrestrial BS. The
result indicates the benefit of applying more transmit antennas
for beamforming design in the MISO system. When the value
of p increases, the performance gaps become large gradually,
which implies that the proposed robust design methods are
very sensitive to the SINR constraint at PU. In the high SINR
region, we can clearly see that the proposed Bernstein-type
method with Nt = 6 can save 1:4 dBW power compared with
this method with Nt = 4 due to the optimized transmission.
Similarly, almost the same power consumption can be saved in
the proposed S-Procedure method.
We further probe into the relationship between the trans-
mission power and the maximum outage probability  in Fig.
5 when  ranges from 0:01 to 0:25 and the minimum SINR
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Fig. 6. Feasibility rate versus channel error variance .
constraint at PU p are respectively set as 5 dB and 10 dB. As
we can see in the figure, the average transmission power of the
proposed methods degrades with the increasing of maximum
outage probability  for different p, and the performance
gap of the two proposed methods stays parallel in the whole
outage probability region. For fixed outage probability , the
observation we have is that the average transmission power
under p = 10 dB is superior to that under p = 5 dB, This
is reasonable, because more transmission power is required for
meeting the SINR constraint at PU.
To further assess the effectiveness of our robust transmit
design, we show the feasible rate comparison versus channel
error variance  where the results are averaged over 1000 trials
and we set p = 10 dB, e = 0 dB, s = 15 dB and
 = 0:1 for the robust design methods. As the results shown in
Fig. 6, one can see that the feasibility rate of the S-Procedure
method is lower compared to the Bernstein-type method, which
is due to the use of less variables in the S-Procedure method.
While the feasible rate of non-robust method is always one
since the channel errors do not exist when assuming perfect
CSI. In addition, it can be found that with the increasing of
channel channel error variance , the feasibility rates of the
proposed methods significantly decrease. The reason behind this
phenomenon lies in the fact that the robust schemes are very
sensitive to the channel error variance .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the secure robust beamforming design in a CST-
N was investigated with the consideration of channel uncertain-
ty. Based on the probabilistic CSI error model, we presented an
outage-constrained robust formulation where the channel errors
10
were Gaussian distributed, and the objective was to minimize
the transmit power while satisfying the required constraints.
Due to the presence of the probabilistic constraints, the original
power minimization problem did not seem tractable directly.
To address the non-convexity of the formulated optimization
problem, we transformed the highly intractable constraints in-
to a series of convex forms via advanced matrix inequality
techniques, namely S-Procedure and Bernstein-type inequality
restriction techniques, resulting in safe approximate solutions.
We further showed that the computational complexity of the
S-Procedure method was inferior to that of the Bernstein-type
inequality method. Finally, numerical results have demonstrated
the validity of the proposed schemes.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove the rank condition ofW, we first rewrite the robust
optimization problem (29) as
min
W;p;e;s
Tr(W) (36a)
s.t. D(p) +  Hp A p  0; (36b)
D(e) +  
H
e W e  0; (36c)
D(s) +  
H
s W s  0; (36d)
W  0; p  0; e  0; s  0; (36e)
where
D(p) =
"
pINt 0Nt1
01Nt
Pp
p
jhpj2   2p   p Im(1 p)2
#
; (37)
D(e) =
"
eINt 0Nt1
01Nt 
2
e   Ppe jhej2   e
Im(1 e)
2
#
; (38)
D(s) =

sINt 0Nt1
01Nt  Ppjhsj2   2s   s Im(1 s)2

; (39)
 p =
h

1=2p ; g^p
i
;  e =
h

1=2e ; g^e
i
;  s =
h

1=2s ; g^s
i
:
(40)
Let  = fZp;Ze;Zs;Tg denote the collection of dual
variables, where Zp  0, Ze  0, Zs  0 and T  0 are
corresponding to the constraints (36b)-(36e), the Lagrangian of
problem (36) with respect to W can be derived by
L(;W) = Tr(W)  Tr
h
Zp
 
D(p) +  
H
p Zp p
 i
  Tr
h
Ze
 
D(e) +  
H
e Ze e
 i
  Tr
h
Zs
 
D(s) +  
H
s Zs s
 i
  Tr
h
TW
i
: (41)
With the Lagrangian dual function, the dual problem of (36)
is presented by
max
Zp0;Ze0;Zs0;T0
min
W0
L(;W): (42)
It is noted that the primal problem (36) is convex with a
strict feasible point and it satisfies the Slater’s condition, which
implies that the strong duality holds between problem (36) and
its dual, i.e., the duality gap tends to zero. This guarantees that
the optimal solution to problem (36) can be attained by solving
(42).
Denote the optimal solution of problem (42) by  =
fZp;Ze;Zs;Tg, then the optimal solution to problem (36),
W, can be found by solving the following form:
min
W0
L(;W): (43)
For ease of exposition, L(;W) can be expressed, after
some mathematical manipulations, as
L(;W) = Tr(W) + `; (44)
where
 = INt +  pZ

p 
H
p    eZe He  
1
s
 sZ

s 
H
s  T; (45)
` =  Tr [ZpD(p)]  Tr [ZeD(e)]  Tr [ZsD(s)] : (46)
Since problem (29) is feasible, the optimal level of the equiva-
lence problem (36) is not less than zero. Moreover, the optimal
duality gap between primary problem (36) and its Lagrange
dual problem (42) is zero. As a result,  is certainly positive
semi-definite, i.e.,   0, to guarantee that the Lagrangian dual
function has a lower bound, i.e., the Lagrangian dual function
cannot tend to  1. To proceed further, the following theorem
is introduced:
Theorem 1: Given Hermitian matrix W 2 CNtNt , if
rank(W) = K  Nt, then W can be derived as W =PK
k=1 vkaka
H
k , where vk and ak are the k-th non-zero eigen-
value and the k-th eigenvector related to W, respectively.
Following the similar procedure of [30], the rank-one property
of the optimal solution to (44) can be explicitly verified.
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